New NRC Records Trace Drone Reports at Nuclear Sites Into 2026

Written by

in

A new collection of Nuclear Regulatory Commission records extends the public account of reported drone activity around American nuclear facilities into March 2026. Liberation Times published its reporting on October 7 and made the underlying records available for readers to examine.

The outlet says the collection contains 67 reports covering 28 sites across 17 states, with register dates from February 2024 to March 2026. Those are counts of reports and locations; an individual entry can describe more than one aircraft or several sightings.

A March report from Byron

The first page of the released NRC register includes entry SID-03362 for Byron Nuclear Station in Illinois. Its narrative says staff observed a drone above the protected area late on March 24, 2026. After midnight, security officers and local law enforcement identified two separate drones over the owner-controlled and protected areas. The entry records contact with the FBI, FAA and Ogle County Sheriff’s Department.

Another entry, SID-03358, describes a February 9 report at Three Mile Island. A contracted employee reported a drone near the island’s northern end, but responding security staff and state police did not themselves see it. That difference in firsthand observation is important when comparing cases.

Security records with limits

Liberation Times also highlights reports from Surry in Virginia during December 2024. One account records plant security receiving confirmation from the Fort Eustis control tower that an object appeared on radar. The published narrative does not supply the radar recording itself.

The first-page entries carry a “Closed Unresolved” status, even where their narrative retains wording about pending review. Readers should preserve that distinction between the status field and the original incident description. Neither field, by itself, identifies an aircraft’s operator or establishes extraordinary performance.

These records offer a clearer chronology of reports, observations and notifications around sensitive infrastructure. They do not establish a single cause linking the sites. Their value is in letting researchers compare named incidents and documented responses while keeping witness estimates, reported corroboration and final technical identification separate.

Comments

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *